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The State of Affairs in BGP Security: A Survey of Attacks and Defenses
Asya Mitseva1, Andriy Panchenko, Thomas Engel
University of Luxembourg
Abstract
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto standard interdomain routing protocol. Despite its critical role on
the Internet, it does not provide any security guarantees. In response to this, a large amount of research has proposed
a wide variety BGP security extensions and detection-recovery systems in recent decades. Nevertheless, BGP remains
vulnerable to many types of attack. In this work, we conduct an up-to-date review of fundamental BGP threats and
present a methodology for evaluation of existing BGP security proposals. Based on this, we introduce a comprehensive
and up-to-date survey of proposals intended to make BGP secure and methods for detection and mitigation of routing
instabilities. Last but not least, we identify gaps in research, and pinpoint open issues and unsolved challenges.
Keywords: Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), Internet Routing, Security
1. Introduction
The Internet consists of a large set of networks, called
autonomous systems (ASs), identified by unique AS num-
bers (ASNs). Each AS contains a number of hosts and
routers under the administrative control of a single en-
tity [1]. ASs are granted a set of delegated IP addresses,
which are, in turn, assigned to their hosts and routers.
Each AS is responsible for forwarding traffic at least to
and from its IP addresses. To do this, ASs are connected
via dedicated links and negotiate reachability information
using Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Contiguous IP ad-
dresses are aggregated in blocks (i.e., prefixes), each con-
sisting of a n-bit IP address (n equals 32 for IPv4 and 128
for IPv6 respectively) and a mask length to reduce the
number of routes distributed between ASs [1].
ASs set up routes via BGP based on their local poli-
cies. Despite its critical role on the Internet, BGP is not
designed to provide any security guarantees and, thus, re-
mains vulnerable to attacks [2, 3] and misconfigurations [4],
causing instabilities in the routing system or severe reacha-
bility problems. As well as frequent routing incidents [5, 6],
BGP threats are exploited for country-level censorship [7,
8], damage to cryptocurrencies [9], and tracking users of
anonymization networks [10]. Moreover, spammers often
conduct BGP attacks so as to remain untraceable [11, 12].
Although a large amount of research has proposed a
variety of BGP security extensions in recent decades [13,
14, 15], none has been universally deployed on the In-
ternet. Besides the lack of AS willingness, most of the
solutions either only target particular aspects of routing
1Corresponding author. Email address: asya.mitseva@uni.lu.
Postal address: University of Luxembourg, 6 Avenue de la Fonte,
L-4364 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg.
vulnerabilities or require a significant computational over-
head [16, 17]. In this work, we conduct an up-to-date
review of fundamental BGP vulnerabilities and possible
attacks. We also bring together various requirements for
BGP security solutions based on previous research and
present a methodology for evaluation of existing security
proposals. Last but not least, we introduce an extensive
and up-to-date overview of proposals intended to make the
routing protocol secure.
Early surveys [18, 19, 20, 21] provided a review of
BGP security solutions focusing only on some of the issues.
Later works [22, 23] presented a more broad overview. In
2010, Butler et al. [24] published the most comprehen-
sive survey of both research and standardization efforts to
make BGP secure. Concurrent work was performed by
Huston et al. [25]. In contrast to our work, these works
covered BGP security extensions reflecting the state of the
art more than ten years ago and only a limited number
of detection-recovery approaches. Because of the critical
role of BGP on the Internet and its unadequate protec-
tion against attacks, research on securing BGP contin-
ued. Thus, a new comprehensive and up-to-date survey
is needed to systematize and reveal the potential and the
limits of the state-of-the-art solutions.
Recently, Siddiqui et al. [26] reviewed the standardiza-
tion efforts made by the IETF Secure Inter-Domain Rout-
ing Working Group (SIDR WG) to secure BGP, but fo-
cused on two major security extensions only. Cardona et
al. [27] focused on contributions intended to improve only
the availability of BGP networks. Al-Musawi et al. [28] re-
viewed various techniques seeking to detect BGP anoma-
lies, but neither presented methods for localization of root
causes and routing anomaly mitigation nor focused on any
security solutions. The most recent survey by Bennesby












da Silva [29] summarized state-of-the-art efforts improv-
ing the interdomain performance without discussing BGP
security issues. In contrast, we present a broad overview
of countermeasures to protect BGP against attacks pro-
posed in recent years and survey methods for detection,
mitigation, and localization of routing instabilities. We
further summarize research exploring different properties
of existing proposals. This group of works was typically
overlooked by previous surveys [22, 24, 25, 26].
Our contributions are as follows: (i) We review fun-
damental BGP threats and possible attack vectors (Sec-
tion 3). (ii) We collect desired properties for secure BGP
and present a methodology for evaluation of existing meth-
ods to securing BGP (Section 4). (iii) Based on this,
we present an extended review of existing BGP security
proposals and detection-recovery systems, identify their
strengths and limits (Section 5 and 6), and highlight open
issues, gaps in research and unsolved challenges (Section 7).
In the following section, we introduce fundamentals of the
Internet and BGP needed for the rest of this paper.
2. Basics of Border Gateway Protocol
Curently, the AS interconnectivity is mainly based on
confidential business agreements. In recent decades, the
inferring of relations between ASs has been extensively
studied by the researchers [30, 31, 32, 33]. According to
Gao et al. [34], there are two main groups of commer-
cial relationships: customer-provider and peer-to-peer. In
a customer-provider relationship, an AS (i.e., customer)
pays another AS (i.e., provider) in order to access the rest
of the Internet. The provider, in turn, may also be a cus-
tomer of another AS. In a peer-to-peer relationship, two
ASs with networks of similar size negotiate a link between
themselves and exchange traffic free of charge. Based on
the type of relationship with its neighbor, an AS decides
how to propagate incoming routes to other ASs. The fol-
lowing export rules2 are typically used: (i) routes learned
by a customer AS are advertised to other customer, peer,
and provider ASs, and (ii) routes learned by a peer or a
provider AS are announced to customer ASs only. Due to
the greater resulting revenue, an AS always prefers a route
via its customer over a route via its provider or peer.
On the Internet, most of the customer ASs only carry
traffic whose source or destination is located within the AS,
and are known as stub ASs. A stub AS that is connected to
a single AS is called single-homed stub AS. However, stub
ASs often establish connections to multiple ASs to provide
resilience and load balancing for their services. Such ASs
are known as multi-homed stub ASs. Provider ASs are
also able to forward traffic whose source and destination
are not in these ASs. These are called transit ASs.
Based on their routing policies and negotiated inter-
connections, ASs announce routes to a variety of prefixes
2Also known as valley-free rules [34].
through BGP [1]. Initially, routers (i.e., BGP speakers)
establish a TCP connection from one to another and send
an open message to start a BGP session. To keep the ses-
sion active, keepalive messages are periodically transmit-
ted. Once the initial routing data has been exchanged be-
tween the routers, only incremental updates are sent when
a routing information base (RIB) changes. To announce
new routes, route updates, or route withdrawals, routers
exchange update messages. In addition, the routers may
employ routing flap damping (RFD) and minimum route
advertisement interval (MRAI) timers. The RFD timer
measures how often a route is withdrawn and re-announced.
If a given threshold is exceeded, the route is flagged as
damped (i.e., unstable) and cannot be selected as the best
route. The MRAI timer defines the amount of time that
needs to pass before a route can be re-advertised to neigh-
bors. The aim of both timers is to decrease the frequency
of routing changes and message overhead and, thus, reduce
the routers’ load and limit overall routing instability.
Each update message contains the following main at-
tributes: (i) a prefix advertised, (ii) an AS originating this
prefix, (iii) a sequence of ASs that the message traverses,
called the AS path, and (iv) the IP address of the next
router to the destination. In case of a multi-homed AS,
the AS may include a multi-exit discriminator (MED) to
specify the best link to its neighbors. When forwarding
update messages, each router prepends the ASN belong-
ing to its AS to the AS path. Thus, routing loops can be
detected and eliminated.
On receipt of a valid update message, a BGP speaker
stores the new routing information in its RIB. The RIB of
every router consists of three distinct parts: Adj-RIBs-In,
Loc-RIB, and Adj-RIBs-Out. The Adj-RIBs-In contains
routes learned from other BGP speakers. In accordance
with its local policy, the BGP speaker selects a set of
routes that it will use itself, and stores them in Loc-RIB.
The BGP router also chooses a set of routes that will be
advertised to neighboring BGP speakers, and lists them in
Adj-RIBs-Out. Although each AS defines its own routing
policy, a general rule in the route decision process is that
higher preference is given to a route with a more specific
IP prefix, known as longest prefix match rule [1].
3. Classification of Attacks on BGP
BGP threats are caused by three fundamental vulnera-
bilities. First, BGP infrastructure is susceptible to physi-
cal attacks by outsiders, e.g., damage to hardware or cables
between ASs [3]. Such attacks fall into the field of physical
and logical security and are out of scope of this work.
Second, neither BGP nor the underlying protocols in-
clude any mechanism that prevents tampering with pro-
tocol data by outsiders. Since BGP messages are carried
upon a TCP session, approaches proposed to secure TCP
connections (e.g., by using cryptography) can also be ap-












































































Figure 1: Types of (sub)prefix hijack attacks: The malicious AS3 falsely announces the (sub)prefix of AS4 and attempts to force AS1 to
adopt fake routes to this (sub)prefix.
do not discuss TCP attacks and possible countermeasures,
but refer the reader to [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43].
Third, even if an intentional corruption of control mes-
sages by outsiders can be eliminated by hardening the
TCP protocol and physical links, BGP does not ensure
that legitimate participants do not use protocol data in
a malicious manner or distribute bogus data injected into
the routing information. E.g., bogus attributes indicating
a false origin AS or a tampered AS path may cause se-
vere disturbance to the routing process. Protection against
tampering with routing information is described as secur-
ing the control plane. Furthermore, BGP does not guar-
antee that routers forward packets in a manner consistent
with the announcements they have made via control mes-
sages, i.e., the packets can be dropped, rerouted or de-
layed. Therefore, securing the data plane is also required.
Focusing on the third group of threats, we summarize
different attacks based on previous research and present
the following attack taxonomy:
Data falsification attacks: A malicious AS is capable
of injecting corrupted routing data into BGP messages.
Here, the following attack vectors are possible:
Prefix hijack: As shown in Figure 1(a), an AS falsely
claims to originate a prefix not delegated to it. This causes
a multiple origin AS (MOAS) conflict to be observed by
other ASs. E.g., on November 6, 2015, a large Indian Inter-
net service provider (ISP) started originating thousands of
forign prefixes3. The bogus announcements were accepted
by some ASs and further propagated to their neighbors.
Although MO S does not directly indicate an attack [44],
the attacker can avoid conflict by originating unadvertised
prefix (e.g., used by spammers). A recent study [12] has
shown that more than 20% of the global prefix space is
delegated, but not publicly announced.
Subprefix hijack: Another way the attacker can pre-
vent a MOAS conflict is by advertising a subnetwork of
3https://bgpmon.net/large-scale-bgp-hijack-out-of-india/
an existing prefix which does not belong to the attacker
(Figure 1(b)). This event is also known as de-aggregation
attack4. If no other ASs originate this prefix, most ASs
adopt the route due to the longest prefix match rule. E.g.,
on April 27, 2017, a large Russian ISP started claiming to
originate several more specific prefixes of existing prefixes
that are typically advertised by other ASs5.
AS path forgery: The attacker may arbitrarily tamper
with the AS path in update messages. Instead of forging
the origin AS, he modifies the AS path to avoid a MOAS
conflict and causes one-hop prefix hijack. To do this, the
attacker announces a fake link between his AS and the
victim AS (Figure 1(c)). Another version of this attack
is to announce a fake link to a subprefix of the victim
AS (Figure 1(d)), also known as one-hop subprefix hijack.
Research by [47, 48] showed the practicability of these at-
tacks. In addition, due to economic incentives ASs may
also intentionally modify the AS path in BGP messages
and, thus, advertise more attractive (e.g., shorter) routes
at the control plane, but still use another sequence of ASs
at the data plane to forward the traffic. This attack is
known as traffic attraction attack and its feasibility was
empirically explored in [49].
Interception attack: This is an improved version of (one-
hop) (sub)prefix hijacks. The attacker has a valid route to
the victim AS. He can not only redirect traffic through it,
but also forward it back to the real destination without
disturbing the connectivity. On December 12, 2017, for a
time period of six minutes a Russian AS conducted several
prefix and subprefix hijacks of IP blocks belonging to well
known and high traffic Internet organizations and rerouted
the attracted traffic back to the legitimate destinations6.
Replay/Suppression attack: A malicious AS replays or
4Please note that ASs often apply de-aggregation to recover their
prefixes from prefix hijack [45] or implement traffic engineering and,















suppresses withdrawal for a previously announced route.
Although there is no such real event documented, every
registered Internet outage may be caused by this attack.
Collusion attack: Two colluding non-neighboring ASs
create a virtual tunnel between each other and build a
BGP session through it. Thus, they generate forged routes
without causing any suspicious routing conflicts. The fea-
sibility of the attack was empirically demonstrated in [50].
Protocol manipulation attacks: Here, a malicious AS
aims to manipulate properties of the routing protocol it-
self. The following attack vectors are possible:
MED modification: Similar to other BGP attributes,
the multi-exit discriminator is not also protected which, in
turn, may lead to tampering with MED values of routes.
Thus, a malicious AS may affect ASs’ decisions.
Exploit RFD/MRAI timer: A malicious AS artificially
withdraws and re-announces a route. Thus, ASs using
the RFD timer consider the route unstable and ban it.
On the other hand, ASs employing the MRAI timer delay
their distribution of the corresponding update messages.
Hence, this route may seem unreachable for some ASs.
The feasibility of the attack was empirically showed in [51].
Data misuse attacks: An AS uses correct routing data
in a malicious way. Possible attack vectors are as follows:
Denial of service (DoS): By causing heavy congestion
on routers or links carrying BGP messages [2, 52], the
attacker creates congestion-induced BGP session failures.
When BGP sessions are recovered, the routers first need to
exchange full routing tables. This increases their load [53]
and introduces significant convergence7 delays [2]. An-
other type of DoS is to create continuous withdrawals and
re-advertisements of target routes to a victim AS, causing
deliberate link flapping8. Other ASs tag these routes as
unstable and start suppressing their further propagation.
Although there are no such real events documented, every
registered Internet reachability problem may be caused by
these attacks.
Route leak: This attack occurs when an AS propagates
routes to ASs not intended to receive them under the terms
of negotiated business agreements. E.g., a customer AS
leaks a route received from one provider to another, even
though this contradicts with the valley-free export rules
(cf. Section 2). On August 26, 2017, Google accidentally
leaked routes leaned from its peers to some of its providers
and, thus, became a transit AS [54]. As a result, many
users (especially those in Japan) experienced slowness of
the Internet or even a complete connectivity disruption.
To sum up, attacks on BGP increase the load on routers
and cause instabilities and connectivity problems [2, 4, 55].
E.g., the adversary may create a back hole (i.e., drop traf-
fic) by hijacking a prefix or eavesdrop traffic and perform
man-in-the-middle attacks in case of an interception.
7BGP convergence measures the propagation and processing time
needed by routers to settle on a best route.
8In contrast to the protocol manipulation attacks, this attack does
not require the RFD timer to be in use.
4. Desired Properties for Secure BGP
Previous research took into account distinct require-
ments that need to be addressed when developing a BGP
security solution. To better understand the strengths and
limits of existing BGP security proposals, we bring to-
gether all desired properties based on previous research
that need to be incorporated in the new secure routing pro-
tocol. Our categorization covers four main dimensions: se-
curity, privacy, performance, and deployability.
4.1. Security Properties
BGP security proposals need to take into consideration
all known vulnerabilities of the legacy protocol (described
in Section 3) and provide countermeasures to eliminate
these threats. Moreover, they need to guarantee that they
do not introduce any new attack vectors that have not
been observed when using the plain BGP protocol.
4.2. Performance Properties
BGP security solutions need to provide certain perfor-
mance properties to be deployed and used on the Internet.
Convergence delay: How fast do routers settle on a best
route? As a baseline, we assume the convergence time
measured when the legacy protocol is used.
Stability: Besides the risk of a prolonged convergence
time, it is important to verify if convergence is ever reached.
Otherwise, the quality of connections to some prefixes may
degrade or even be lost during the transient period.
Scalability: How well does a new secure routing protocol
scale as the number of ASs adopting it increases? Does
the protocol scale when fully deployed on the Internet?
Computational overhead: How many BGP control mes-
sages need to be processed per unit of time? How many
additional, CPU-intensive, operations need to be executed
on each message compared to ordinary BGP? This also
considers the case when auxiliary, more powerful hardware
is needed to perform these computations.
Bandwidth overhead: This refers to the rate of BGP
control messages to be sent. Furthermore, including ad-
ditional attributes in the messages to provide security im-
pacts the bandwidth required to transmit them.
Storage overhead: This refers to the degree of additional
memory on each BGP router that a new BGP security so-
lution requires compared to the plain BGP implementa-
tion. It also includes the case when an AS needs to use
auxiliary hardware to fulfill the new storage requirements.
4.3. Privacy Properties
BGP security proposals should also consider the fact
that ASs often desire to keep their routing policies, busi-
ness relations, and other commercial data private.
Routing privacy: How much additional sensitive infor-















The integration of a new BGP security solution de-
pends not only on its degree of security and performance
properties, but also on how easy it is to bootstrap the so-
lution on the Internet scale. To explore this, we consider
the following properties.
Deployability: Can the new BGP security proposal be
deployed incrementally over a period of time? Does it en-
able information forwarding between routers supporting
the secure protocol and those running the legacy protocol
in the same AS? Due to the large number of ASs compos-
ing the Internet, the coexistence of a plain and a secure
BGP implementation should be taken into account. This
means that ASs that have upgraded their infrastructure to
the new protocol also need to provide backward compati-
bility to enable routing with non-adopters.
Adoptability: Once the incremental adoption of a new
BGP security solution is initiated, adoptability denotes
the quantity of volunteer ASs willing to adopt the new
protocol over time, i.e., how far the adoption will spread.
The set of initial adopters and their routing policies sig-
nificantly impact the degree of protocol adoptability.
5. BGP Security Enhancements
As early as 1988, Perlman [56] conducted the first com-
prehensive study on routing protocol security. She drew
attention to the fact that routing protocols are robust to
simple failures, but cannot counteract Byzantine failures,
i.e., if a node intentionally modifies, delays or forges mes-
sages. Previous surveys [22, 24, 25] extensively reviewed
early research works suggesting improvements for BGP
and other distance-vector routing protocols. Neverthe-
less, since these proposals neither presented a complete
BGP security solution nor took into account deployment
and performance issues, finding defenses to protect BGP
against attacks remained an active area of research. In the
following, we review current state-of-the-art BGP secu-
rity solutions and discuss their pros and cons with respect
to the set of properties presented in Section 4. Figure 2
summarizes main BGP security solutions presented in this
section. While we still describe some early approaches
also covered by [22, 24, 25], we use them as a baseline
to show the reader how each group of BGP security so-
lutions has evolved in recent decades. Recently, Siddiqui
et al. [26] and Al-Musawi et al. [28] also presented sur-
veys on BGP security. Contrary to our work, they either
reviewed the standardization efforts made by the IETF
SIDR WG only or focused on detection techniques and
completely ignored BGP security proposals. Last but not
least, we summarize works that mainly concentrated on
the evaluation of different properties of existing proposals.
This area of research was typically overlooked by previous
surveys [22, 24, 25, 26].
5.1. Real-world Protection Practices
Before focusing on research proposing BGP security en-
hancements, we present current protection practices used
by network operators. Today, several ASs extend their
routing policies by adding rules to filter out potentially
bogus prefix announcements. Network operators take into
account not only AS business relationships, but also filter
out special-use IP addresses, announcements containing
private ASNs or too long AS paths [24]. They often restrict
advertisements for networks smaller than /24 to prevent
size explosion of the global routing tables [57] and the num-
ber of prefixes that a neighboring AS can announce [58].
Thus, the routers are protected from memory exhaustion
and a possible leaking of entire network tables is limited.
To create their route filters, network operators also rely on
publicly available lists of bogus announcements [59] and
public repositories with routing data. Route filtering is
particularly effective if applied by provider ASs to restrict
bad routes announced by their customers. Recently, net-
work operators have additionally applied peer locking [60]
to further restrict faulty routes unintentionally announced
between provider A s and peer ASs. To construct AS path
filters, they rely on out-of-band communication with each
other to announce allowed interconnections.
Due to their simplicity and effectiveness, route filtering
and peer locking are an attractive incomplete solution used
by many ASs for many years. ASs neither need to modify
the legacy protocol nor invest money in hardware replace-
ment. However, the creation, maintaining, and update of
filter lists creates a significant computational and storage
overhead. Apart from this, the need for exchange of com-
mercial data seriously violates the privacy requirement and
may discourage many ASs from using peer locking. While
peer locking limits possible misconfigurations, it cannot
prevent intentional attacks as it is based on trust between
ASs. Thus, neither approach provides a long-term solution
for secure interdomain routing.
A popular public repository containing routing data is
the Internet Routing Registry (IRR)9. IRR aims to provide
a shared global view of correct routing information by en-
abling ASs to voluntarily upload routing data. Other ASs
can retrieve this data and use it to build their route filters.
Despite tools developed to execute consistency checks of
registered policies [61, 62], uploading and extracting data
from IRR remain error-prone due to complex routing poli-
cies and the distributed nature of the IRR [4, 63]. More-
over, the IRR itself has to be secure, accurate, and up-to-
date to be effective. Due to lack of access level privileges,
ASs are not willing to upload confidential routing infor-
mation. Although previous research [64] tried to enhance
the IRR by enabling authorized verifiable post and search
of routing data, many security concerns regarding content
















































































































Control-/ Data-plane n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n /  n / n  / n
Attacks Covered:
Prefix / Subprefix hijack  /  n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n n / n  / 
AS path forgery  n  n   n n  n n  n n  
Interception attack  n  n   n n  n n  n n  
Replay/Suppression attack             n n  
Collusion attack                
MED modification    n   n n     n   
Exploit RFD/MRAI timer                
Denial of service                
Route leak  n  n         n n  
Performance
Convergence delay    n   n n n n n  n n  n
Stability n n n  n n          
Scalability                
Computational overhead       n n n n   n n n n
Bandwidth overhead    n   n n n n   n n n n
Storage overhead n n n n n n n n n n n   n n n
Privacy
Routing privacy             n n  
Deployability
Deployability n n n  n n n n n n n n   n n
Adoptability                
Status
Adopted / Standardized  /   /   /   /   / n  /   /   /   /   /   /   /   /   /   /   / 
Academic paper only   n n  n n n n  n n n n n 
Figure 2: Summary of main BGP security proposals. RPKI enhanced represents first-hop authorization approaches and S-BGP enhanced
describes the use of amortization and aggregation of signatures. Notion: n has feature,  partially has feature,  does not have feature.
5.2. Proposals Securing the Control Plane
The primary goal of most of the works is to ensure that
the data payload of the BGP protocol and the semantics
of the payload are authentic and correct. In other words,
a router can reliably verify that incoming data is not re-
moved, modified or replayed during the transmission. On
a receipt of an update message, the router has to be able
to validate the advertised prefix, authorize the origin AS,
and check the correctness of the AS path and other addi-
tional attributes if present. Existing proposals use various
techniques (including cryptographic) to do this.
5.2.1. Proposals Relying on DNS
Reference to [65] suggested the use of the DNS as a
distributed database for origin validation. To this end,
the authors assumed a creation of a new DNS zone for
IP prefix delegation managed by IANA. Within this zone,
each node in the DNS tree corresponds to one or more
IP prefixes delegated to an AS. On receipt of an update
message, a BGP router performs a DNS query to verify
the origin data announced in the message. However, this
approach does not replicate the IP address allocation hi-
erarchy and, thus, introduces management issues. In re-
sponse to this, recently Gersch et al. [66, 67] presented a
new naming convention where the mask length of the pre-
fix is encoding in a binary format. Although these works
assume the use of DNSSEC to provide data authenticity,
the main issue with this idea is that it tries to solve BGP
security problems by placing implicit trust in another in-
secure protocol. Moreover, these proposals do not address
route authorization.
5.2.2. Proposals Relying on Overlay Networks
Several works have suggested keeping BGP unchanged,
but use complementary protocols or technologies to vali-
date control-plane routing data. Early work by [68] pro-
posed Interdomain Route Validation (IRV) protocol that
operates independently of BGP. Every AS manages its own
IRV server, where it stores its AS-specific policy data. On
receipt of an update message, a BGP router contacts its
local IRV server to check if the obtained routing data is
correct. The IRV server, in turn, queries the IRV server of
the relevant AS to validate the routes. Hence, to verify the
correctness of an AS path, one queries the IRV servers of
all ASs involved. Each IRV server can enforce levels of ac-
cess control over sensitive routing data and, thus, limit the
exposure of confidential relationships. BGP speakers can
also upload routing reports to IRV servers, including re-
ceived announcements, topology data, etc. Thus, the IRV
service is able to detect misconfigurations and monitor net-
work health in general. Recently, Chen et al. [69] enhanced
the IRV protocol to provide a secure communication be-
tween IRV servers. To this end, the authors introduced
differentially private query-answer sessions. Nevertheless,
the main limitations of these approaches remain their scal-
ability, the need for AS collaboration, bootstrapping the
service, and recovering from outages.
To reduce the complexity of BGP and, thus, the quan-
tity of misconfigurations, an amount of research went one
step further and suggested to completely separate the rout-
ing decision process from the routers [70]. Kotronis et
al. [71, 72] outsourced the routing control plane to an ex-













will select the same contractor, each contractor can build
clusters of ASs and maintain them in a centralized man-
ner using a Software Defined Networking (SDN) controller.
Other works [73, 74] designed SDN-based Internet Ex-
change Points (IXPs) to improve the operation of the In-
ternet routing, e.g., by implementing more expressive traf-
fic control policies, without removing BGP. While these
works mainly aimed to improve the Internet performance,
they did not explored the impact on the routing security.
To sum up, solutions taking use of supplementary pro-
tocols or technologies neither require modifications to BGP
nor create further computational and storage overhead for,
or require reconfiguration of, BGP speakers. However,
they are less dynamic than routing changes. This may
create problems when route authorizations change quickly
and slow down convergence. ASs also need to set up ad-
ditional equipment to create an overlay network.
5.2.3. Proposals Relying on Asymmetric Cryptography
The most promising group of BGP security propos-
als is based on asymmetric (i.e., public-key) cryptography.
Typically, they rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
for assignment and distribution of public keys.
Kent et al. [14] proposed the first comprehensive ap-
proach to secure BGP, Secure-BGP (S-BGP). S-BGP em-
ploys digital signatures and associated public key certifi-
cates to validate announced routing data. By using a PKI
that imitates the existing IP address and ASN assignment
system rooted by IANA, the authors authenticate prefix
allocations, routers’ identities, and organizations owning
ASs. Each organization that has an allocated set of pre-
fixes or ASNs has been issued a certificate by the resource
holder in the PKI hierarchy. The resource holder also is-
sues certificates for the routers belonging to the ASs. To
verify that an AS is allowed to originate a route to an IP
prefix, Kent et al. used digitally-signed statements, address
attestations (AAs). An AA consists of a single AS and a
set of IP prefixes, and is signed by the resource holder.
The AAs are distributed out-of-band and verified through
the certificate chain from the origin AS to IANA. AAs
eliminate (sub)prefix hijack attacks, but do not prevent
AS path modifications. Thus, route attestations (RAs)
are added to the syntax of update messages. A RA is
signed by each router which it was forwarded through,
where all routers on the path sign previously attached sig-
natures. Although RAs mainly target protecting the AS
path attribute, they can also be extended to cover other
vulnerable BGP attributes, e.g., the MED [75]. To secure
the underlying TCP session and prevent active wiretap
attacks from outsiders, the IPsec protocol [40] is used.
Although S-BGP addresses most of the BGP threats,
it introduces significant computational costs and perfor-
mance issues that hamper its adoption [76, 77]. In response
to this, White suggested Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [15]
aiming to provide a trade-off between security and over-
head. Like S-BGP, soBGP uses a PKI consisting of three
types of certificates. The first certificate type binds an
ASN to a public key. Based on a web-of-trust authentica-
tion model, each AS has a certificate issued by a trusted
anchor (e.g., large ISPs or well-known authentication ser-
vice providers). The second certificate type binds an ASN
to a set of prefixes that this AS is allowed to advertise.
The third certificate type contains information about the
routing policies and neighboring ASs of each AS. This data
is used by a soBGP router to create its own view of the
network topology, which, in turn, is needed to validate in-
coming update messages. If the AS path contained in
the update message violates the router’s topology, the
route is dropped. Compared to S-BGP, where AAs are
distributed out-of-band, in soBGP the certificates provid-
ing origin authentication are exchanged in-band via a new
message type. The other two certificate types are dis-
tributed out-of-band. Thus, in contrast to S-BGP, where
the RAs are sent with every update message, the network
topology built by soBGP is static and requires frequent
synchronization of topology updates across ASs. Although
soBGP provides more configuration flexibility [78], the va-
riety of options and the use of non-standard certificates
create several interoperability challenges [75].
Wan et al. [79, 80] presented pretty secure BGP (ps-
BGP), which implements origin authorization based on a
decentralized trust model between ASs, and validates the
AS path in route announcements using a rating-based ap-
proach with the help of a certificate hierarchy. In psBGP,
every AS creates a prefix assertions list (PAL) used to vali-
date whether an AS is allowed to originate a prefix. A PAL
contains the set of prefixes delegated to that AS and a list
of IP prefix ownership assertions for the neighbors from
the point of view of that AS. To verify the authenticity
of an origin AS, a BGP router checks the consistency be-
tween the PALs of ASs that are neighbors of the origin AS.
Like S-BGP, psBGP uses signatures to perform AS path
validation. Each AS also expresses its believe in the trust-
worthiness of the other ASs. To reduce the computational
overhead, psBGP uses these beliefs to decide whether to
validate all signatures on a path or only a subset of them.
Besides the significant protocol overhead created by S-
BGP, soBGP, and psBGP, a major deployment barrier for
these solutions is the non-existence of a global PKI. Hu
et al. [81] suggested a strategy to incrementally develop
such a PKI. First, each AS creates and uses a self-signed
certificate to sign prefix announcements. As adoption in-
creases, larger ASs sign the certificates of their customers
and become trust anchors for them. Under the control of
IANA, large ASs can cooperate to establish a well-defined
root of trust. Also, there is the need to negotiate sign-
ing algorithms in router environments [22]. In 2012, the
SIDR WG presented the first standardized architecture,
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [82, 83], which
provides a global PKI for origin authorization in a similar
manner to S-BGP.
While RPKI limits (sub)prefix hijack attacks, it does
not prevent AS path modifications. BGPsec [84] is a pro-













sequence of ASs which a route announcement traverses.
BGPsec relies on RPKI to ensure origin authorization. As
with S-BGP, each router uses its certificate to sign the
data received from the previous router, the ASN it be-
longs to, and the ASN of the next router on the path, and
includes it in the message. BGPsec also requires periodic
key rollovers of routers’ certificates to restrict replay at-
tacks by authorized routers [85]. This means routers’ cer-
tificates are periodically refreshed and update messages
are re-sent using the newly-generated certificates. As most
of the ASs (i.e., stub ASs constituting about 85% of the
ASs on the Internet [86]) need to replace their hardware
in order to support BGPsec, the SIDR WG also allowed
the use of an asymmetric BGPsec communication, simplex
BGPsec [16]. A stub AS sends BGPsec announcements
and receives plain update messages from its provider.
Stub ASs do not need to perform heavyweight BGPsec
signature validation and, thus, are encouraged to adopt
BGPsec. Recently, the SIDR WG further improved BG-
Psec by inserting a special field in update messages that
sets AS routing policy to prevent route leaks [87]. This
field is set to zero to indicate no restrictions concerning
the recipients of a route, and one to specify that providers
and peers should not receive the route. Yet, it does not
ensure that the policy is indeed enforced. The information
about restrictions may also reveal commercial data. Song
et al. [51] further proposed an improvement to BGPsec in
order to limit protocol manipulation attacks, in particular
the manipulation of RFD and MRAI timers. The authors
added secure root cause information to each update mes-
sage that is generated by the root cause AS and contains
its ASN, timestamp, and prefix destination. To limit the
frequency of intentional routing changes and, thus, keep
overall routing stability, each receiving router verifies the
announcement and discards all messages whose checks fail.
The benefits provided by BGPsec in partial deployment
are questionable, which slows down its adoption [17]. To
fill the gap meanwhile, Cohen et al. [88, 48] proposed an
extension to RPKI. Each resource holder issues a path-end
record containing a list of adjacent ASs through which its
AS is reached. On receipt of an update message, a BGP
router uses these records to check if the penultimate AS
appears in the list of neighbors of the origin AS. While this
prevents one-hop prefix hijack attacks, two- and more-hop
prefix hijack is possible. Although the authors argue that
the success rate of such attacks decreases due to longer
paths announced by the attacker, related work has shown
that, even by advertising a longer path, an adversary is
able to attract a significant amount of traffic [89].
The BGP security proposals described above are typi-
cally divided into four groups based on the degree of secu-
rity they provide. Methods that only validate if an AS is
allowed to advertise a prefix, e.g., RPKI, are konwn as ori-
gin authorization (OA). First-hop authorization (OA+1)
represents approaches validating not only the prefix allo-
cation, but also the first AS on the route adjacent to the
origin AS, e.g., RPKI including path-end records. Both
groups neither require protocol modifications nor create
convergence delays in the Internet. However, they assume
a supplementary hardware to validate prefix origin ASs
and only protect against a few specific routing attacks.
Along with origin authorization, methods that further ver-
ify the existence of a route to a prefix based on an AS-level
Internet map, e.g., soBGP, are known as routing topology
path verification (RTPV). The final group is called path
validation (PV). Here, the methods provide not only ori-
gin authentication, but also validate every AS on the route
to the announced prefix, e.g., S-BGP, psBGP, BGPsec.
These are believed to be the most promising solutions,
due to the extensive security they offer. Although intu-
itive optimizations to these proposals have been discussed,
e.g., using additional hardware [76] or caching update
messages to reduce the number of signature verification
operations [76, 77, 90, 91], their expensive cryptographic
operations remain a major obstacle to their adoption.
In response to this, several works have focused on de-
creasing the protocol overhead created by these solutions.
These works rely mainly on different cryptographic schemes
to reduce the computational costs, either regarding pre-
fix ownership authorizations or route attestations. Con-
centrating on the costs of origin authentication, Aiello et
al. [92, 93] formalized the semantics of prefix delegation
and proposed efficient proof structures for carrying del-
egation attestations. Besides simple attestations created
for each route announcement (as in S-BGP) and authen-
ticated delegation lists containing all delegations made by
a single institution, the authors also considered authenti-
cated delegation trees based on a Merkle hash tree and au-
thenticated delegation dictionaries. Using the latter, they
showed the feasibility of in-band origin authentication.
Nicol et al. [77] applied signature amortization to re-
duce the number of signatures needed. Each BGP speaker
builds a bit vector representing intended receivers when
announcing the same route to multiple neighbors. Instead
of creating distinct signatures, the router signs the update
message once, appends the bit vector, and sends it to its
neighbors. Each receiving router uses the vector to check if
it is the target recipient. To advertise several routes to dif-
ferent ASs, a BGP speaker first collects update messages
intended for a set of ASs and creates a Merkle hash tree
with them. The router signs them collectively by executing
only one signing operation. Again, it sends the signature,
the signing material needed for verification, and the bit
vector in a single update message. By using the vector,
a receiving router checks if the message is intended for it
and validates the route. While this method is efficient in
terms of processing time, it dramatically increases the size
of update messages compared to S-BGP and, thus, the
bandwidth overhead and router’s memory costs.
Subsequent work by Zhao et al. [94] combined signa-
ture amortization with another cryptographic technique
for aggregating signatures to reduce the memory overhead.
The main advantage of the aggregate signature approach













the same length as a regular signature for one message.
Recently, Brogle et al. [95] suggested another aggregate
signature method that allows a BGP speaker to insert its
own signature to an unverified update message, sends it
immediately, and, thus, postpone the verification for some
later time period. However, since each router has to also
add a random string to the signature to enable the later
verification, the signature size of an update message grows
linearly with the number of ASs in the AS path.
To avoid the use of PKI, Boldyreva et al. [96, 97] ap-
plied identity-based (IB)10 sequential aggregate signatures.
However, IB-based systems lack a method of key revoca-
tion [13]. In response to this, Mancini et al. [98] enhanced
the approach by adding timestamps to the signatures and,
thus, enforced prefix and route revocations. Another work
by Li et al. [99] also suggested a method based on IB-based
cryptography. Since the authors rely on a trusted attes-
tation service running on each BGP router, they argue
that each AS needs to only validate the announcements of
its neighbors in order to guarantee AS-path authenticity.
The main issue with this idea is that the routing security
strongly depends on the security of the attestation ser-
vice. Xiang et al. [100] used another method to reduce the
computational costs for signing and verifying signatures.
As ASs decide which routes to distribute based on business
contracts with their direct neighbors, they need to sign and
announce only path segments representing a route learned
from a previous AS and exported to a successor AS.
To reduce the costs of path validation, Butler et al. [101]
combined several methods, including hash chains and sig-
nature aggregation. A router sends all available paths to
its neighbors along with tokens representing hash chain an-
chors. When a route changes, it can be represented by an
authentication token that is verified through hash opera-
tions. Like [94], the authors used a Merkle hash tree to sign
a set of update messages collected until the MRAI timer
expires. Finally, they exploited the stability of path adver-
tisements through caching cryptographic proofs and, thus,
reduced the number of cryptographic operations needed.
In summary, this group of studies does not provide a
complete BGP security solution, but tries to optimize dis-
tinct building blocks of existing proposals. While most of
the works focus mainly on minimizing the computational
and storage overhead, they inadequately evaluate the im-
pact of the proposed optimization on the other properties,
e.g., convergence delay, scalability, stability. Most of the
works are based on a misinterpretation of the semantics of
the MRAI timer [25], incorrectly assuming that this timer
effects all update messages to a given router.
5.2.4. Proposals Relying on Symmetric Cryptography
Another way to keep low protocol overhead when se-
curing BGP is to apply symmetric cryptography. Re-
10IB cryptography is a type of public-key cryptography where the
public keys of the parties are their identities. The corresponding
private keys are maintained by a trusted third-party entity [98].
search by [102] suggested a method for path validation
using nested message authentication codes (MACs). Each
AS listed in the AS path of an update message shares a
secret key with a predefined node intended to verify the
message (the validator). An origin AS builds a MAC over
a concatenation of an initial authenticator value and its
prefix, and adds the MAC to an update message. Analo-
gously, each subsequent AS creates a new MAC, in which it
uses the MAC obtained from the incoming announcement.
Each following MAC covers not only the data received, but
also the authenticator value of the previous router. On re-
ceipt of an update message, the validator uses all known
secret keys to recursively verify the AS path announced.
This approach was improved in a follow-up work by
Hu et al. [13]. The authors presented Secure Path Vector
(SPV) protocol using a sequence of one-time off-line signa-
tures, where the signer executes expensive cryptographic
operations prior to their use, making the signing proce-
dure faster. Although SPV is efficient in terms of com-
putational costs, it creates significant overhead, as a large
amount of state information needs to be transfered and
processed. Moreover, Raghavan et al. [103] showed that
SPV does not prevent AS path forgery and collusion at-
tacks. The authors also argued that some standard digital
signatures are as efficient as one-time signatures with re-
spect to route validation. Based on this, Yin et al. [104]
further optimized the performance of the signature gen-
eration and verification algorithms used in SPV, and also
reduced the size of the created signatures.
Bruhadeshwar et al. [105] explored another symmetric
key approach, based on square grid protocol, to overcome
the complexity of SPV. An interesting aspect of this work
is that the authors assume that one of the routers on the
path is trusted in order to reduce the size of the advertise-
ments. Once the trusted node has validated an update
message, it does not need to forward the signing material
from the previous BGP routers to its successors.
Nevertheless, the main concerns that prevent the use of
symmetric key approaches to secure BGP remain the long-
term security of the symmetric keys (i.e., they cannot be
used for long periods as they are vulnerable to brute-force
attacks), and their resistance to collusion.
5.2.5. Privacy-preserving Techniques
Recent works have applied novel paradigms to secure
the routing protocol and keep the AS routing policies pri-
vate. Gupta et al. [106] proposed a method based on se-
cure multi-party computation (SMPC) that outsources the
route computation. To this end, the work assumes a pre-
defined set of computational servers. Each AS sends its
routing policy (i.e., route ranking and export policy) to
the servers. The routing policy is divided into n parts
(n equals the number of servers) and each part is sent to
one server. The servers apply SMPC over this input to
compute possible routes and send them back to those ASs
involved in each route. While this proposal enables fast













scalability and computational overhead are questionable.
In particular, the approach requires high processing time,
as the internal computations executed by the servers mir-
ror the BGP operation, i.e., the servers simulate BGP by
using the input data from the ASs.
Asharov et al. [107] further explored the idea of us-
ing SMPC to secure interdomain routing. By applying an
improved state-of-the-art SMPC algorithm, the approach
ensures security in case of no honest majority and scales
better for a large number of ASs. Compared to [106], each
AS only sends information about its relations with neigh-
bors. ASs may additionally label a preferred neighbor or
define export policies to express special preferences. To
reduce the computational costs, the algorithm does not
consider stub ASs, as they do not have customers and do
not carry transit traffic.
Henecka et al. [108] proposed another privacy-preserving
routing protocol that computes the shortest AS path based
on Bellman-Ford algorithm. Instead of outsourcing route
computations, each AS forwards encrypted messages along
all known links to a predefined destination, cumulatively
summing weights for the links by using homomorphic en-
cryption. On receipt of all messages, the destination AS
can determine the shortest path, even though the inter-
mediate ASs on the route are kept private. The main
disadvantage of this work is its significant message over-
head. It further requires a prior knowledge of candidate
destinations for the creation of routes between ASs.
Inspired by the idea of Bitcoin, Hari et al. [109] used
the blockchain to secure interdomain routing. The au-
thors introduce two types of transaction published in the
blockchain. The first aims to provide prefix and ASN
ownership authentication and authorization. If an address
holder has been allocated a prefix, an attempt to allocate
this prefix to another entity by anyone other than the ad-
dress holder will fail. The second transaction type records
all route announcements to provide path validation. The
input of a current transaction corresponds to the previous
AS on the path and the output represents the next AS of a
route. However, the use of the blockchain introduces scal-
ability issues due to the huge number of transactions, and
slows down convergence as the transactions are published
periodically on the blockchain.
To sum up, to make their proposals attractive for de-
ployment, these works focused mainly on the privacy guar-
antees that a new secure routing protocol needs to offer.
However, since these solutions are too young, issues such
as computational overhead, scalability, and single point of
failure due to the use of centralized servers, are not exten-
sively explored and merit further research.
5.3. Proposals Securing the Data Plane
The design of BGP does not include any mechanism
to guarantee that routing announcements validated in the
control plane match the actual forwarding paths in the
data plane [110]. An intuitive solution to this issue is to
check path consistency between the control plane and the
data plane through traceroute when forwarding traffic. By
sending packets with increasing time to live (TTL) values
and receiving the corresponding ICMP time exceeded re-
sponses from a destination, traceroute creates a sequence
of addresses on the path as long as no packets are be-
ing lost. However, besides the lack of message integrity
in traceroute (i.e., an attacker may tamper with probe
packets), Mao et al. [111] discovered difficulties in retriev-
ing AS-level paths from traceroute output. To mitigate
this, the authors proposed an AS-level traceroute tool that
relies on a comprehensive set of IP-to-AS mappings cre-
ated by multiple publicly available sources, e.g., whois,
BGP routing data from specific vantage points. Padman-
abhan et al. [112] further enhanced traceroute by adding
cryptography to ensure the integrity and authenticity of
data-plane probes. Another work by Augustin et al. [113]
suggested Paris traceroute, which aims to mitigate non-
existent nodes and loops falsely reported by traceroute.
To sum up, traceroute-based countermeasures are appro-
priate for diagnostics when a problem is detected, but they
do not scale for path consistency checks in real time, as
they need to permanently probe all possible routes.
Instead of using traceroute, Avramopoulos et al. [114]
proposed encrypted tunnels between routers, through which
data traffic and probes are forwarded. While this method
verifies end-to-end connectivity, it does not provide full
route integrity, i.e., traffic still can be misrouted by inter-
mediate ASs. Another work [115] presented a combination
of techniques to address this. The authors assume that the
intermediate ASs are explicitly specified by the source AS
in every data packet. A MAC authentication mechanism
is used for packet validation. In addition, the destination
AS needs to acknowledge the receipt of every packet to
the source and intermediate ASs. In summary, apart from
the fact that both proposals require AS collaboration and
prior distribution of shared secrets (or keys), they also
create significant computational and bandwidth overhead
and, thus, may not scale if deployed on the Internet.
To reduce this overhead but still keep a certain de-
gree of route integrity, Wong et al. [116] proposed a ded-
icated lightweight verification protocol. An AS initiating
a transmission injects a part of a predefined shared se-
cret into some of the data packets. An AS receiving this
data traffic replies to the sending AS by using the other
part of the shared secret to prove its presence on the path.
The routers also keep a list of valid and invalid responses
to detect and localize potential malicious BGP speakers.
While this proposal avoids the use of cryptographic oper-
ations, it relies on expensive off-line secret exchange. To
enable on-line distribution of secrets, Bruhadeshwar et al.
[117] presented key distribution protocols for [116]. Simi-
lar source and path validation methods were also presented
in [118, 119, 120, 121, 122]. Typically, these works enforce
the routers to add a cryptographic primitive to each packet
and, thus, ensure that the traffic traverses the correct path.
For example, Liu et al. [119, 120] aimed to provide source













into IP packets. A source AS adds a sequence of ASNs
and the corresponding MACs generated using predefined
secret keys shared between the source AS and the other
ASs on the route. Each succeeding AS validates its MAC
using its shared key. Nevertheless, the primary limitation
of these approaches remains scalability, the need for prior
distribution of shared secrets (or keys), and computational
and bandwidth overhead. In addition, they do not address
incremental or partial adoption.
Research by Subramanian et al. [123] suggested the
Listen & Whisper protocols that detect not only inconsis-
tencies in the data plane (Listen), but also address control-
plane vulnerabilities (Whisper). The Whisper protocol re-
lies on nested signatures added to route announcements
to provide origin authorization. Each origin AS creates a
signature field in an update message to bind a particular
prefix to its ASN. Each intermediate AS updates this field
by using a cryptographic hash function. The Listen proto-
col inspects TCP packets to detect data-plane anomalies.
In particular, it observes the completeness of TCP con-
nections, i.e., if the transmission of management packets
is followed by data packets, and compares data packets and
acknowledgments to identify a possible prefix reachability
problem. Mizrak et al. [124, 125] and Argyraki et al. [126]
also monitored traffic patterns to detect faulty packet for-
warding. Based on traffic statistics that are periodically
collected and shared between ASs, network operators can
localize the source of packet loss, delay or anomalous traf-
fic. Again, these methods require significant storage and
processing overhead, and introduce scalability restrictions.
Moreover, they do not use any cryptographic operations,
making them vulnerable to bogus traffic injection and tam-
pering. Other works focused on generalized data-plane
fault localization protocols, which are also adaptable to
BGP. Due to space constraints, we do not discuss them,
but refer the reader to [127, 128, 129].
Zhu et al. [130] presented an alternate design for in-
terdomain routing. Instead of utilizing BGP, routers cre-
ate an approximate topology map of AS interconnectiv-
ity by using active and passive probing in the data plane.
Wendlandt et al. [131] suggested building a route reposi-
tory, used to determine an optimal path to a destination.
The authors do not directly assume the truthfulness of the
routes. Instead, the service measures the performance of
each path (e.g., by using Listen [123]) to identify if it is
a usable route. Large transit ASs may additionally pro-
vide information about existing routes to the repository.
As in [114], the service creates a tunnel to the destination
domain to transmit data traffic.
In conclusion, all data-plane methods described above
(expect Listen & Whisper) are auxiliary countermeasures
and need to be used in combination with a control-plane
proposal. The existing data-plane methods also rely mainly
on an inspection of distinct packets by verifying crypto-
graphic primitives, making them unsuitable for widespread
deployment.
5.4. Evaluation of Existing Proposals
Instead of suggesting new BGP security enhancements,
several works concentrated on investigating different prop-
erties of existing proposals. Early work by [76] evaluated
the performance of S-BGP and empirically showed the sig-
nificant computational, bandwidth, and storage overhead
of the protocol. Nicol et al. [77] explored the convergence
delay introduced by pure S-BGP and S-BGP using a sig-
nature amortization technique. Beside the performance
issues, there is no consensus on how to bootstrap more
sophisticated secure routing protocol on Internet scale.
Therefore, several works evaluated the degree of security,
deployability, and adoptability of distinct proposals. Fig-
ure 3 summarizes of this amount of research.
Chan et al. [132] were the first who showed the impor-
tance of the adoptability in the design of BGP security
solutions when partially deployed. Given a predefined set
of initial adopters, they showed that PV methods indi-
cate up to ten times greater adoptability under weak at-
tacker model11 compared to OA and RTPV. OA+1 and
PV provide similar degree of adoptability under strong
attacker model12. Yet, these results are biased by the sim-
plified AS topology model used for simulations, i.e., ASs
always prefer shortest paths and announce their paths to
all neighbors. Furthermore, Chan et al. did not discuss
how to select the initial set of adopters. To overcome the
latter, Avramopoulos et al. [133] studied the security im-
pact of different groups of ASs originally adopting a se-
curity solution. They achieved a good protection of traf-
fic transmitted by the adopters using up to five Tier-1
ASs13. The authors also argued that control- or data-
plane detection methods can be added to the security pro-
tocol to get around the problem of partially-secure paths.
Gill et al. [16] further proposed a strategy how to effi-
ciently adopt security solutions, e.g., S-BGP, soBGP or
BGPsec, by creating proper incentives for ASs to deploy
them. Like [133], Gill et al. confirmed the need for a few
Tier-1 ASs initially adopting the new protocol. Although
these works [16, 132, 133] showed promising results re-
garding partial deployment, they assume that ASs always
prefer secure routes.
Contrary to the assumption above, Gill et al. [135] re-
vealed that the majority of network operators do not pri-
oritize the use of secure routes in their routing policies.
Taking this into account, Lychev et al. [17] showed that a
secure BGP solution such as S-BGP and BGPsec has only
meager benefits in partial deployment in contrast to the
standardized solution, RPKI. Even worse, the need for a
coexistence of plain and secure BGP implementation cre-
ates new attack vectors. On the one hand, malicious ASs
may intentionally disable the use of the secure BGP for
11The attacker can only access BGP traffic sent directly to it.
12The attacker can eavesdrops any BGP connection.
13Tier-1 ASs compose the core of the Internet. They do not have













Research work Target solution Properties
Security Performance Privacy Deployability
Kent et al. [76] S-BGP – 3 – –
Nicol et al. [77] S-BGP, signature amortization – 3 – –
Chan et al. [132] OA protocols, OA+1 protocols, – – – 3
RTPV & PV protocols
Avramopoulos et al. [133] S-BGP, soBGP – – – 3
Raghavan et al. [103] SPV 3 – – –
Goldberg et al. [110] PV protocols 3 – – –
Goldberg et al. [89, 144] OA protocols, soBGP, 3 – – –
S-BGP, data-plane verification, route filtering
Gill et al. [16] S-BGP, soBGP, BGPsec – – – 3
Boldyreva et al. [145] S-BGP, soBGP 3 – – –
Lychev et al. [17] RPKI, S-BGP, BGPsec – – – 3
Cooper et al. [139] RPKI 3 – – –
Heilman et al. [140] RPKI 3 – – –
Wählisch et al. [137] RPKI – – – 3
Gilad et al. [138] RPKI – – – 3
Figure 3: Overview of research works investigating different properties of a target BGP security solution.
some routes, known as downgrade attack, and, thus, ren-
der the deployment of secure BGP useless for groups of
ASs. On the other hand, the lack of consensus amongst
ASs where to place the security in the routing policy may
cause the existence of multiple stable BGP states14. Con-
trary to [16, 133], Lychev et al. showed that Tier-2 ASs15
initially adopting the secure protocol will provide better
security than Tier-1 ASs.
The only one standardized security solution, RPKI,
still suffers from poor adoption on the Internet despite
the extensive efforts devoted by the SIDR WG and the
support by major router vendors [136]. Several works ex-
plored potential reasons for this scarce adoption. Wählisch
et al. [137] showed that only 6% of the prefixes containing
Alexa16 Top one million websites are covered by RPKI.
The more popular websites are less likely to be secured
than the less popular. The authors revealed that some or-
ganizations worry to deploy RPKI, as its certificate hier-
archy indicates to some extend AS business relationships.
Gilad et al. [138] argued that the main factors that hinder
the RPKI adoption are human errors, causing the inva-
lidity of RPKI objects, and dependencies between orga-
nizations, causing ASs wishing the incorporate RPKI to
wait for other ASs to deploy it first. They showed that
about 10% of the IP address space is upward-dependent,
i.e., an AS incorporating RPKI should receive a RPKI ob-
ject signed by an entity which did not deployed RPKI yet,
and about 90% of the prefixes are downward-dependent,
i.e., an AS incorporating RPKI should wait another en-
14If the primary route chosen by an AS is broken, the AS selects
another route. When the initial route is available again, the AS still
keeps the route later selected instead of converging to the previous
stable BGP state.
15In contrast to Tier-1 ASs, Tier-2 ASs need to purchase transit
to reach some destinations on the Internet.
16https://www.alexa.com/
tity allowed to advertise a subprefix of the AS’s prefix to
obtain a RPKI object first.
Along with the lack of incentives for adoption, the hi-
erarchical architecture of RPKI assigns to centralized au-
thorities disproportionate power to unilaterally revoke au-
thorization or tear down prefixes under their control. In
particular, Cooper et al. [139, 140] demonstrated how abu-
sive organizations may cause legitimate routes to be clas-
sified as invalid by manipulating the contents of RPKI
publication points and, thus, rejected by ASs preferring
secure routes only. Last but not least, concerns regarding
the RPKI scalability, e.g., total number of RPKI objects,
consistent, fresh view of all RPKI objects by ASs, have
been raised in recent years [141, 142, 143].
Several works have shown that promising BGP secu-
rity proposals such as RPKI, S-BGP, and BGPsec par-
tially solve the security problems of the legacy protocol
even fully deployed. Goldberg et al. [89, 144] explored
the weaknesses of these secure protocols and quantified
their efficacy against traffic attraction attacks. The au-
thors showed that BGP security proposals only address
the security of route announcement semantics, but cannot
ensure the contractual legitimacy of the routes. In par-
ticular, Goldberg et al. argued that an adversary is able
to attract even more traffic by only manipulating his ex-
port policies rather than using data falsification attacks.
Another work by Goldberg et al. [49] further argued that
unrealistically strong AS routing policy restrictions, along
with a fully deployed control-plane security solution, e.g.,
S-BGP, are needed to ensure correct data-plane packet for-
warding. Boldyreva et al. [145] performed a cryptographic
analysis of secure routing protocols by studying, generaliz-
ing, and formalizing known threats. They formally proved
that S-BGP satisfies origin and route authorization, but
does not ensure route validity, and soBGP fails to meet













To sum up, while the majority of recent research mainly
explore the deployability and security properties of several
BGP security proposals, other features such as scalability
and stability completely lack of investigation.
6. Detection and Mitigation of Anomalies
The fact that none of the existing BGP security so-
lutions incorporates all desired properties (cf. Section 4),
in particular the incomparability with existing hardware
and the meager benefits achieved by state-of-the-art ap-
proaches when partially deployed, minders the adoption of
a new secure routing protocol for future time. As a tem-
poral workaround, some research has focused on detect-
ing, localizing, and mitigating routing anomalies. While
previous surveys either reviewed BGP security solutions
and ignored anomaly detection mechanisms [26, 18] or cov-
ered a limited quantity of detection and mitigation tech-
niques reflecting the state of the art more than ten years
ago [22, 24, 25], we look through modern state-of-the-art
methods aiming to not only identify and mitigate routing
anomalies, but also locate the root cause. Recently, Al-
Musawi et al. [28] reviewed different methods seeking to
detect BGP anomalies. Contrary to our work, the authors
neither surveyed works trying to locate the perpetrator of
a suspicious routing event nor reviewed mitigation propos-
als. In the following, we briefly summarize early research17
on detection, localization, and mitigation techniques and
focus on more recent works not covered by previous sur-
veys in detail. Thus, we aim to show how the research in
this area has evolved in the recent decade.
Anomaly detection: Detection techniques aim to
discover suspicious information or behavior in routing data
and then raise alarms. We divide existing detection meth-
ods into three groups based on the type of information they
monitor: control-plane methods, data-plane methods, and
a combination of both. The control-plane detection ap-
proaches usually observe update messages to recognize
malicious intents. Early works mainly focused on detecting
(sub)prefix hijack events. Some proposals either relied on
a static prefix ownership map or used optional attributes
in BGP messages to identify bogus announcements [24].
Research by [146] suggested the origin AS to be directly
notified by the ASs receiving multiple origins advertise-
ments for its prefix. Lad et al. [147] presented a real-time
alert system where the address owners register their pre-
fixes. The system monitored announcements from public
databases and notified prefix owners via email if AS origin
data changes. Qiu et al. [53] revealed a similar method
based on historical routing data of prefix ownerships and
AS link data. Various heuristics were applied to validate
the collected information. Siganos et al. [148] used prefix
allocations and ASN assignments from regional Internet
17Interested readers are referred to [22, 24, 25, 28] for more details.
registries and AS routing policies from IRR to verify the
correctness of origin data announced in update messages.
To avoid a single point of failure created by the systems
described above, Hiran et al. [149, 150] detected (sub)-
prefix hijacks using a distributed method. The authors
applied two Chord-based distributed hash tables (DHTs)
containing prefix origin data and information related to
the AS itself, respectively. Similar to [147], this method
relied on reports of participating ASs to build the ground
truth. On a receipt of an announcement containing a new
(i.e., not seen before) prefix or origin AS, the receiving AS
queries the first DHT to check for a potential (sub)prefix
hijack. If the event is confirmed, the legitimate AS is noti-
fied. The second DHT is mainly applied for collaborative
fault detection, e.g., identifying spamming. Like [149, 150],
Heaberlen et al. [151] also used existing trust and business
relationships between ASs to detect routing anomalies.
BGP routers within an AS record all update messages
they sent or received in a log file. The file, along with a set
of rules describing the AS routing policy, is revealed to the
AS’s neighbors to check how the rules are followed. To pre-
vent log tampering, BGP is extended to support message
authentication for logs and acknowledgements confirming
the successful storing of the log by neighbors. Yet, this
method requires ASs to reveal their routing policies. Sim-
ilar methods for detecting AS relationship violations and
anomaly traffic were also presented in [152, 153, 154, 155].
Compared to [151], they rely on cryptographic signatures
or SMPC, together with principal component analysis to
avoid revealing commercial data.
Various machine learning methods were also used for
routing anomaly detection. Research by [156] applied Sup-
port Vector Machines and Hidden Markov Model to iden-
tify malicious routing intents. The authors proposed sev-
eral types of features to represent a routing anomaly, e.g.,
the total number of announcements and withdrawals ex-
changed. Relying on features similar to those presented
in [156], Guo et al. [157] applied an adaptive fusion-based
method to build a model for normal routing behavior and
used it for anomaly detection. Zhang et al. [158] relied
on unsupervised clustering techniques to recognize devia-
tions from the normal state of BGP data flow. Lutu et
al. [159] argued that prefixes that are less visible in the
Internet than expected by the prefix owners is an indica-
tor for routing issues. The authors periodically collected
BGP messages from vantage points and assigned a visibil-
ity degree to each prefix based on the fraction of ASs that
have an active stable route for it. Given a ground-truth
dataset representing the expected visibility status of pre-
fixes provided by network operators, Lutu et al. applied
a decision-tree machine learning model to automatically
distinguish potential routing instabilities.
Recently, Li et al. [160] revealed the correlation be-
tween routing loops and route leaks and presented an ap-
proach for detecting routing loops and, thus, identifying
active route leak events. Chang et al. [161] claimed that













that it will repeat this in some future time. By using
knowledge about previous prefix hijack events, the authors
generated reputation values for each AS and used them to
trigger real-time alerts. Although network operators typ-
ically restrict the number of prefixes that a neighboring
AS can announce, Khare et al. [58] empirically showed
that routing-table-leak events occur in the Internet. To
detect these events, the authors observed if an AS (e.g.,
that occasionally leaks its routing tables) starts simulta-
neously originating prefixes of many other ASs as its own
for a short time period in order to detect potential pre-
fix hijacks. Yet, this method generated a large number
of false positives due to the similarity between prefix hi-
jacks and legitimate routing changes. In response to this,
Su et al. [162] focused on improving the detection scheme
by Khare et al. The authors argued that typically prefix
hijacks between neighboring ASs do not occur and Tier-
1 ASs neither conduct nor experience prefix hijacks and,
thus, significantly reduced the quantity of the false pos-
itives. Another amount of research [163, 164, 165] used
visualization methods to graphically represent either up-
date messages or changes of AS paths and prefix owner-
ships and, thus, drew attention on potential routing issues.
Data-plane detection methods typically involve perma-
nent probing of the Internet to identify AS path modifica-
tions and prefix unreachability. Early work by [166] used
continuous active probing to measure the number of hops
from a predefined vantage point (i.e., monitor) to a target
prefix. If a significant variation is detected, the monitor
further checks for changes in the AS path to a reference
point. The reference point is an IP address outside of the
target prefix, but still topologically very close to it. Thus,
the route from the monitor to that reference point is al-
most identical (i.e., a sub-path) to the route to the target
prefix. Hence, in contrast to valid route changes that affect
both routes equally, prefix hijack introduces significant dif-
ference between them, as the IP address of the reference
point is not within the affected prefix. Quan et al. [167]
applied Bayesian inference to weigh periodically collected
probing data and, thus, estimated the status of each pre-
fix. If the availability of a prefix becomes uncertain, the
system starts continuously scanning IP addresses belong-
ing to this prefix until it determines whether the prefix is
up or down. The use of Bayesian inference reduces the
frequency of permanent active probing to target prefixes.
Contrary to the approaches above, Hiran et al. [168]
used round trip time (RTT) measurements that are pas-
sively collected by end users in various networks while ac-
cessing Internet resources in order to avoid the overhead
costs of active probing. The gathered data is periodically
sent to a centralized entity that performs outlier detection
to identify routing anomalies. Yet, major RTT deviations
do not necessarily imply an attack. They can also occur
due to network congestion. Therefore, beside RTT mea-
surements Balu et al. [169] also took into account the num-
ber of intermediate hops, similarity of paths that packets
traverse on, and the propagation delay in order to reduce
the quantity of false positives.
Zhang et al. [170] proposed a system where a prefix
owner continuously probes known transit ASs to detect if
its prefix has been hijacked. Djatmiko et al. [171] corre-
lated network traffic from multiple monitors distributed in
different ASs by using SMPC to prevent revelation of sen-
sitive data. Each AS then individually analyzed the col-
lected information to diagnose network outages. Goldberg
et al. [172, 173] focused on monitoring the performance
of AS paths in the presence of an attacker. Instead of en-
crypting and authenticating all traffic [114], the sender and
the receiver apply a pseudo-random hash function on each
packet, store the output locally, but transmit packets un-
changed. The sender and the receiver regularly exchange
and compare the collected output to detect packet drop-
ping activity. Yet, this approach does not verify AS identi-
ties on the path and cannot distinguish between malicious
tampering and network congestion. Zhang et al. [174] fo-
cused on probabilistic acknowledgement-based protocols
to localize a packet-dropping adversary while keeping a
balance between improved detection rate and communi-
cation overhead. Like some data-plane detection meth-
ods [164, 165], Fischer et al. [175] visualized collected prob-
ings of various destinations to identify routing anomalies.
Some related works combined data- and control-plane
measures to overcome issues introduced by these methods
when used separately. To detect (sub)prefix hijacks in real-
time, early research by Hu et al. [47] applied data-plane
probing to build fingerprints for end hosts and networks
only after a suspicious update message is observed. To do
this, Hu et al. considered several properties to characterize
a prefix, e.g., operating systems of end hosts, TCP/ICMP
timestamps. Research by [176, 177] used control-plane
data to detect suspicious routes and data-plane measures
to check the reachability of IP addresses within a prefix.
If the system identified a potential malicious announce-
ment, it used publicly-available looking glass servers18 to
collect control-plane route status for the prefix and probed
for active IP addresses belonging to this prefix. The au-
thors compute the correlation between the control- and
data-plane data gathered to recognize prefix hijack, i.e.,
most of the affected servers cannot receive a reply from
the prefix, while most unaffected servers can. To detect
interception attacks, Hiran et al. [149, 150] compared the
AS path announced in an update message with the AS
sequence retrieved by actively probing the same prefix.
To prevent a large quantity of false positives, Schlamp
et al. [178, 179] tried to detect subprefix hijack attacks by
using update messages to retrieve candidates of hijacked
prefixes and conducting active scans of SSL/TLS-enabled
hosts within these networks. If the hosts use different pub-
lic keys before and during the potential subprefix hijack
event, this event is considered as a real attack. Recently,














to model different types of route leaks and suggested meth-
ods how to detect each of them. Based on data from its
routing table and knowledge about its business relation-
ships with other ASs, an AS can identify potential route
leaks from its customer ASs by checking whether incoming
route announcements are valley-free. To recognize route
leaks from its peer ASs, the victim AS combines active
control-plane probes with passive data-plane traffic mon-
itoring. The latter is also used to detect route leaks not
directed at the victim AS, but still affecting its routes.
Currently, BGPmon19 is the most popular commercial
detection tool widely used by many network administra-
tors. By combining control- and data-plane data from
a hundred vantage points worldwide, it identifies state
changes of the Internet routing operation and monitors
the reachability of prefixes. BGPmon triggers notifica-
tions to the network operators that are sent via multiple
communication channels. However, the AS administrators
should manually investigate each alert in order to deter-
mine whether it is a real routing instability.
Localization of anomaly source: Once a routing
anomaly is detected, only a few works explored the prob-
lem of localizing the perpetrator of a routing failure. Early
research by Feldmann et al. [182] argued that the local
source of routing instability is located either on the path
announced before or on the new path advertised during the
routing event. By collating update messages announc-
ing AS path changes from different vantage points, the
authors created a set of suspicious ASs appearing in all
routes that changed. Research by Javed et al. [183] ana-
lyzed path changes hop by hop and filtered those ASs as
possible root causes whose next-hop downstream AS was
different compared to the one announced before the alter-
nation.
By using various heuristics, Katz-Bassett et al. [184]
compared historical probe data with a current traceroute
measuring to determine the potential misbehaving BGP
speaker. As the Internet routing is asymmetric, the au-
thors used spoofed packets to probe a path in one direc-
tion without needing to probe the other and, thus, iden-
tified the broken route direction. However, they were not
able to determine the hops along the reverse path. To ad-
dress this, Katz-Bassett et al. applied reverse traceroute
in their follow-up work [185]. Qiu et al. [186] argued that
an AS conducting (sub)prefix hijack or interception attack
cannot manipulate the portion of a route between its up-
stream neighboring AS and a vantage point. Observing
that the routes from a set of vantage points to an affected
prefix converge around the misbehaving AS, the authors
ranked candidate ASs based on their appearances in path
neighborhood sets and the total distance between each of
them and the vantage points in order to narrow down a
set of potential misbehaving ASs.
Anomaly mitigation: Several works went one step
further and explored possible mitigation techniques. Early
19https://bgpmon.net/
research mainly focused on methods ignoring or demoting
suspicious routes once they are detected. Wang et al. [187]
suggested preferring known stable routes over short-lived
routes to protect routes to top-level DNS servers. How-
ever, this method does not scale for arbitrary routes. Zhang
et al. [188] contacted a set of predefined ASs, lifesaver ASs,
that delete bogus routes from their routing tables and pre-
vent their further propagation. Each lifesaver AS also an-
nounces shorter (more attractive) valid routes to the vic-
tim. Careful selection of lifesaver ASs is critical for the
effectiveness of the bogus-route purging method and the
promotion of valid routes. Karlin et al. [189, 190] proposed
pretty good BGP (pgBGP), which blocks the propagation
of suspicious new paths for a given time period. While this
prevents the distribution of bad short-lived routes, large
convergence delays ensue. Therefore, Zhang et al. [191]
suggested that ASs use trusted paths for traffic forwarding,
but still propagate the suspicious routes to their neighbors.
Recently, Katz-Bassett et al. [185] exploited BGP poi-
soning to avoid traversing a misbehaving AS without dis-
turbing other working routes. Given that an alternative
path exists during a routing failure, the affected origin AS
artificially creates a loop along the route containing the
faulty AS. To avoid the loop, the misbehaving AS is implic-
itly forced to reject this route and send route withdrawals
to its neighbors. Yet, this method is not applicable if the
BGP loop prevention is disabled or ASes discard poisoned
announcements. Holterbach et al. [192] suggested that
BGP speakers redirect traffic through alternative paths
when outages of primary routes are detected. To do this,
BGP routers within a single AS attach a tag to each incom-
ing packet containing the list of ASs which the packet will
be forwarded through and a precomputed backup next-
hop AS that is used in case of link failure. Sermpezis et
al. [193] used prefix de-aggregation when possible or out-
sourced the distribution of recovery BGP announcements
advertising the hijacked prefix to a third-party organiza-
tion. By creating MOAS events, the organization attracts
traffic addressed to the affected AS and tunnels it back this
AS. Qiu et al. [194] discussed how to choose optimal lo-
cations for organization’s agents to improve the gain from
the mitigation method.
Summary: Various techniques for anomaly detection,
localization, and mitigation have been proposed to date.
Nevertheless, none of them provides a compete detection-
recovery system, i.e., they only tackle a specific subprob-
lem. The methods are either impractical due to increased
computational, bandwidth or storage overhead and need
for inter-AS communication or rely on third-party data,
which, in turn, make them inaccurate and easily compro-
mised.
7. Discussion
As we have shown, BGP security solutions proposed
to date either eliminate most of the BGP threats at the













performance. Even though methods based on signatures
and attestations have received considerable attention, and
some of these are partially standardized, frequent expen-
sive cryptographic operations are a major obstacle to their
adoption [76]. In response to this, some works attempted
to reduce the number and length of signatures by ex-
ploiting specific protocol timers. However, these protocol
timers are not used by the vast majority of router ven-
dors and network operators at all [135], making these ap-
proaches infeasible. Instead of public-key cryptography,
other works applied symmetric cryptography for signature
generation. These proposals are still vulnerable to collu-
sion attacks and do not reliably protect route announce-
ments against AS path forgery attacks [103]. Recently, a
few works have explored interdomain routing architectures
based on SMPC. Nevertheless, high computational over-
head and convergence delay, scalability, and single point
of failure due to the use of central servers, remain issues
and need further research.
Most of the BGP security solutions still focus on secur-
ing the control plane and cannot ensure that data traffic is
indeed transmitted over negotiated routes. Unfortunately,
the threat of subverting packet forwarding has received
comparatively little attention. The existing data-plane so-
lutions introduce a high protocol overhead, making them
not applicable in reality. Network operators are unwill-
ing to be transparent to probing tools such as traceroute,
as their internal network structure can be revealed. Thus,
they often block such unauthorized probing. If probing can
be detected by a malicious AS, it can be treated differently
from regular traffic to cover the attack. In addition, none
of the existing BGP security proposals is able to counteract
collusion attacks. Given a virtual tunnel between two non-
neighboring ASs, they can distribute forged routes even if
a secure routing protocol is fully deployed. Therefore, we
encourage the community rethink the extensive effort de-
voted to adopt a new secure BGP protocol. Is it reasonable
to force ASs to invest money in hardware replacement if
the new protocol cannot solve almost none of the issues?
We must also draw attention to the fact that most of the
works proposing and evaluating BGP security solutions
are based on empirically-driven AS topologies. Typically,
these topologies are incomplete and not sufficiently accu-
rate [195, 196] wich, may bias reported results.
Although the detection, mitigation, and localization of
routing anomalies is an active field of research, none of
the existing methods can identify and differentiate among
different routing attacks in real-time. Moreover, most of
these approaches rely on inaccurate and scarce datasets [195,
197] and are prone to false alarms. Even if a malicious
event is detected in a timely manner, the response of the
ASs may take hours [148]. Thus, the damage increases,
since the bogus routes are quickly distributed to other ASs.
Last but not least, recent studies [198, 199] showed
that BGP blackholing is often used for Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) mitigation. By using BGP community
attributes20 or relying on out-of-band information, ASs af-
fected by DDoS attacks inform their neighbors the traffic
from which prefixes needs to be dropped, i.e., which pre-
fixes will be temporarily unreachable. Despite the popu-
larity of this service, none of the current state-of-the-art
detection, localization, and mitigation methods take use
of this information.
8. Conclusion
In this work, we have exposed fundamental drawbacks
of the currently-existing interdomain routing protocol. In
particular, we presented an up-todate list of attacks on
BGP, which pose a severe security risk for diverse applica-
tions and services on the Internet. This has allowed us to
categorize and survey the protection and detection mecha-
nisms for BGP proposed in the literature. Our analysis re-
vealed that these approaches solve only a neglectable small
fraction of the problems, and that in most cases at the cost
of high overhead. Based on this, we finally discussed open
issues and unsolved challenges for further research.
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Classification of BGP Anomalies, in: 13th International Con-
ference on High Performance Switching and Routing (HPSR),
IEEE, Belgrade, Serbia, 2012, pp. 103–108.
[157] Y. Guo, H. Duan, J. Chen, F. Miao, MAF-SAM: An Effec-
tive Method to Perceive Data Plane Threats of Inter Domain
Routing System, Computer Networks 110 (2016) 69–78.
[158] M. Zhang, J. Li, S. Brooks, I-Seismograph: Observing, Mea-
suring, and Analyzing Internet Earthquakes, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking 25 (6) (2017) 3411–3426.
[159] A. Lutu, M. Bagnulo, C. Pelsser, O. Maennel, J. Cid-Sueiro,
The BGP Visibility Toolkit: Detecting Anomalous Internet
Routing Behavior, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
24 (2) (2016) 1237–1250.
[160] S. Li, H. Duan, Z. Wang, X. Li, Route Leaks Identification by
Detecting Routing Loops, in: Security and Privacy in Com-
munication Networks, 2015, pp. 313–329.
[161] J. Chang, K. K. Venkatasubramanian, A. G. West, S. Kannan,
I. Lee, B. T. Loo, O. Sokolsky, AS-CRED: Reputation and
Alert Service for Interdomain Routing, IEEE Systems Journal
7 (3) (2013) 396–409.
[162] S. Su, B. Zhang, B. Fang, Online detection of concurrent pre-
fix hijacks, in: International Conference on Security and Pri-
vacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm), Springer,
Beijing, China, 2014, pp. 69–83.
[163] S. Papadopoulos, K. Moustakas, D. Tzovaras, BGPViewer:
Using Graph Representations to Explore BGP Routing
Changes, in: 18th International Conference on Digital Signal
Processing (DSP), IEEE, Fira, Greece, 2013.
[164] S. Papadopoulos, G. Theodoridis, D. Tzovaras, BGPfuse: Us-
ing Visual Feature Fusion for the Detection and Attribution
of BGP Anomalies, in: 10th Workshop on Visualization for
Cyber Security (VizSec), ACM, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 2013,
pp. 57–64.
[165] M. Syamkumar, R. Durairajan, P. Barford, Bigfoot: A Geo-
based Visualization Methodology for Detecting BGP Threats,
in: Symposium on Visualization for Cyber Security (VizSec),
IEEE, Baltimore, MD, USA, 2016.













Distributed Scheme for Detecting IP Prefix Hijacks in Real-
time, in: Conference on Applications, Technologies, Archi-
tectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications (SIG-
COMM), ACM, Kyoto, Japan, 2007, pp. 277–288.
[167] L. Quan, J. Heidemann, Y. Pradkin, Trinocular: Understand-
ing Internet Reliability through Adaptive Probing, in: SIG-
COMM, ACM, Hong Kong, China, 2013, pp. 255–266.
[168] R. Hiran, N. Carlsson, N. Shahmehri, Crowd-based Detection
of Routing Anomalies on the Internet, in: Conference on Com-
munications and Network Security (CNS), IEEE, Florence,
Italy, 2015, pp. 388–396.
[169] K. Balu, M. L. Pardal, M. Correia, DARSHANA: Detecting
Route Hijacking for Communication Confidentiality, in: 15th
International Symposium on Network Computing and Appli-
cations (NCA), IEEE, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2016, pp. 52–59.
[170] Z. Zhang, Y. Zhang, Y. C. Hu, Z. M. Mao, R. Bush, iSPY:
Detecting IP Prefix Hijacking on My Own, in: SIGCOMM
Conference on Data Communication, ACM, Seattle, WA, USA,
2008, pp. 327–338.
[171] M. Djatmiko, D. Schatzmann, X. Dimitropoulos, A. Fried-
man, R. Boreli, Federated Flow-based Approach for Pri-
vacy Preserving Connectivity Tracking, in: 9th ACM confer-
ence on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
(CoNEXT), ACM, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 2013, pp. 429–
440.
[172] S. Goldberg, D. Xiao, E. Tromer, B. Barak, J. Rexford, Path-
quality Monitoring in the Presence of Adversaries, in: Interna-
tional Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer
Systems (SIGMETRICS), ACM, Annapolis, MD, USA, 2008,
pp. 193–204.
[173] S. Goldberg, D. Xiao, E. Tromer, B. Barak, J. Rexford, Path-
quality Monitoring in the Presence of Adversaries: The Se-
cure Sketch Protocols, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Network-
ing (TON) 23 (6) (2015) 1729–1741.
[174] X. Zhang, A. Jain, A. Perrig, Packet-dropping Adversary Iden-
tification for Data Plane Security, in: CoNEXT Conference,
ACM, Madrid, Spain, 2008.
[175] F. Fischer, J. Fuchs, P.-A. Vervier, F. Mansmann, O. Thon-
nard, VisTracer: A Visual Analytics Tool to Investigate Rout-
ing Anomalies in Traceroutes, in: 9th International Sympo-
sium on Visualization for Cyber Security (VizSec), ACM, Seat-
tle, Washington, USA, 2012, pp. 80–87.
[176] Y. Xiang, Z. Wang, X. Yin, J. Wu, Argus: An Accurate and
Agile System to Detecting IP Prefix Hijacking, in: 19th In-
ternational Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), IEEE,
Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2011.
[177] X. Shi, Y. Xiang, Z. Wang, X. Yin, J. Wu, Detecting Prefix
Hijackings in the Internet with Argus, in: Internet Measure-
ment Conference (IMC), ACM, Boston, Massachusetts, USA,
2012, pp. 15–28.
[178] J. Schlamp, R. Holz, O. Gasser, A. Korsten, Q. Jacquemart,
G. Carle, E. W. Biersack, Investigating the Nature of Routing
Anomalies: Closing in on Subprefix Hijacking Attacks, in: 7th
International Workshop on Traffic Monitoring and Analysis,
Springer, Barcelona, Spain, 2015, pp. 173–187.
[179] J. Schlamp, R. Holz, Q. Jacquemart, G. Carle, E. W. Biersack,
HEAP: Reliable Assessment of BGP Hijacking Attacks, IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 34 (6) (2016)
1849–1861.
[180] M. S. Siddiqui, D. Montero, R. Serral-Gracià, X. Masip-Bruin,
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